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A Bayesian model is presented for the information content of 
earnings announcements. The posterior distribution of the payoff 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The information content of a firm's earnings announcements is defined 
to be the extent of post-announcement revision in the beliefs of market 
agents concerning firm value. Many empirical studies have examined the 
issue of the apparent information content of annual or quarterly earnings 
announcements. Since changes in beliefs are generally unobservable, the 
tradition in these studies has been to infer a change in beliefs from an 
observed change in post-announcement price. 
Ball and Brown (1968) showed that considerable anticipatory price 
movement takes place before the announcement of annual earnings. Their 
results, which have been replicated by numerous subsequent studies for both 
annual and quarterly earnings, suggest that the information content of 
annual or quarterly earnings tends to be preempted by more timely infor-
mation sources. The Bayesian interpretation of such empirical results is 
as follows. The existence of interim information from nonaccounting 
sources provides an improved estimate of the payoff parameter, which in a 
multiperiod world is the vector of all future firm dividends. As the 
amount of interim information increases, the resulting estimate of future 
firm dividends becomes increasingly accurate. In the limit, as future 
firm dividends are known with near certainty, the information value of some 
marginal accounting signal, such as annual or quarterly 
approaches zero. 
earnings, 
Beaver (1968) showed that further price movement occurs in the week of 
announcement of annual earnings. This result, which has also been repli-
cated many times for both annual and quarterly earnings, suggests that 
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there is still some residual information content (that is, belief revision) 
associated with the release of annual or quarterly earnings. 
An important issue, both theoretically and empirically, is the 
identification of determinants of earnings information content. Several 
recent empirical studies have identified firm attributes that are associ-
ated with the extent of post-announcement price movement. Grant (1980) 
showed that post-announcement price movement is, on average, greater for 
over-the-counter stocks (which tend to be smaller firms) than for listed 
stocks. Atiase (1980) showed that post-announcement price movement is, on 
average, greater for smaller firms than for larger firms. These authors 
interpret their findings as evidence that the (cumulative) precision of 
prior information is systematically greater for larger firms. McNichols and 
Manegold (1982) showed that price movement subsequent to the release of 
annual earnings is, on average, greater for firms with no quarterly 
earnings reports than for firms with quarterly earnings reports, a result 
predicted by the theoretical work of Ohlson (1979) discussed below. 
As Lev and Ohlson ( 1982) pointed out in a recent survey of 
market-based empirical research, better theory is required in order to 
interpret existing empirical findings such as the above and to develop new 
empirical questions. This paper develops a Bayesian model relating 
attributes of the market agents' prior information set to post-announcement 
belief revision and, consequently, to post-announcement price reaction. 
The payoff parameter of interest in the model is the final liquidating 
dividend of the firm. 
In a recent theoretical study with a similar objective, Holthausen and 
Verrecchia (1981) demonstrated that the variance of post-announcement price 
reaction increases as the precision of the final earnings report increases, 
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and decreases as the precision of prior beliefs or of the interim earnings 
signal increases. Precision is defined to be the reciprocal of the 
variance of the information random variable. The payoff parameter of 
interest is the final liquidating dividend of the firm. Interim information 
is represented by an interim earnings release, which precedes both the 
final earnings announcement and the announcement of the final liquidating 
dividend. Holthausen and Verrecchia modeled interim and final earnings 
announcements as having a bivariate normal distribution; they showed that 
the variance of post-announcement price reaction is greater when the 
interim and final earnings variables are independent than when they are 
positively correlated. The interim information signal in Holthausen and 
Verrecchia's model can be interpreted as a cumulative signal, and their 
precision of interim earnings can be interpreted as the cumulative pre-
cision of all prior interim information. 
The model treated in this paper is an extension of the model of 
Holthausen and Verrecchia. The information set consists of multiple 
interim information signals, rather than just one; these signals represent 
information from various nonaccounting sources and a single earnings 
release. The increased dimensionality allows various attributes of the 
interim information covariance structure to be analyzed as separate 
theoretical determinants of the information content of an earnings 
announcement. We focus on the marginal importance of a firm's earnings 
release, relative to the importance of information from nonaccounting 
sources. We demonstrate in the model that the weight attached to earnings 
in forming posterior beliefs depends upon the following theoretical 
factors: (1) the precision of earnings, (2) the precision of individual 
interim signals from nonaccounting sources, (3) the number of interim 
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signals observed, (4) the correlation between nonaccounting interim 
signals observed, and (5) the correlation between the interim signals and 
earnings. 
A related theoretical model was given by Ohlson (1979), who demon-
strated that the variance of post-announcement price reaction to annual 
earnings is greater in a coarser disclosure environment (no quarterly 
earnings reports preceding the annual earnings report) than in a finer 
disclosure environment (quarterly earnings reports preceding the annual 
earnings report). Ohlson's interim signals can be interpreted more 
generally to be all prior interim information. In effect, his model 
demonstrates that the information content of earnings depends upon the 
fineness of prior information, a result consistent with our model. 
Our model is similar to the models contained in Ohlson (1979) and 
Holthausen and Verrecchia (1981) in several ways: the models assume 
homogeneous beliefs; they focus on a single firm; they adopt a partial 
equilibrium setting - in particular, the alternative investment opportuni-
ties of investors are exogenous to the models, and the production and 
financing decisions of the firm are assumed to be fixed prior to the 
introduction of information; and the cost of information and the decision 
to acquire information are exogenous to the models. 
We do not model the price formation process directly, unlike the 
models of Ohlson (1979) and Holthausen and Verrecchia (1981). However, our 
results extend easily to price reaction if assumptions about agents' 
preferences similar to those of Holthausen and Verrecchia (1981) and 
Richardson (1983) (negative exponential utility functions) are made. As 
the weight attached to earnings in posterior beliefs increases, ce~erus 
par~hus, price reaction increases also, as Richardson (1983) demonstrated. 
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The setting of our model is a single-period one. The sequence of 
interim information arrival from nonaccounting sources does not assume an 
important role, and the number of such signals can be interpreted as sample 
size. Earnings are announced by the firm subsequent to the observation by 
investors of interim nonaccounting signals but prior to the announcement of 
the liquidating dividend at the end of the period. The draw from nature of 
the liquidating dividend is assumed to occur at the start of the period but 
is unknown to investors until the end of the period. The purpose of the 
model is to analyze the weight attached to earnings in posterior beliefs 
about future firm dividends, a task for which one period is sufficient. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is 
presented in Section 2. Results on posterior distributions and Bayes 
estimators of the payoff parameter are given in Section 3. The relative 
precision of earnings is treated in Section 4, using the coefficient of 
earnings in the Bayes estimator of the payoff parameter as an indicator of 
the importance of earnings information. The magnitude of belief revision 
is examined in Section 5. Interpretation of the results is discussed and 
conclusions are drawn in Section 6. 
2 • FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM 
Let random variables Y1 ,···,Yn represent the interim information 
signals from nonaccounting sources. Let E denote an accounting random 
variable, whose value is given as the firm's earnings release. Let Rr • R 
be the payoff parameter. It will be convenient to define the column 
I * 
vectors Ynx1 !I [Y1, ... ,yn]' !(n+1)x1 
* [1, .•. ,1}', and !(n+1 )x1 5 [1,···,1]'. 
lli E]', 1 1 • 
"'"DX 
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The following assumptions will be made: (i) the probability density 
function fR of R is normal N(y0 ,ab), where the mean y0 and variance a0 
* are known; (ii) the conditional density fY*JR(·Ir) of! given that R • 
.., * 
r is multivariate normal (MVN) with mean vector r! and covariance matrix 
* r(n+1)x(n+1) 
... 
[~xn E .., 
(.OCJ CJ 1' y e-
(A)(J CJ 1] y e 
-
a2 
e 
where I • (1- p)a2 I + pa 2 11' has intraclass covariance structure. This y nxn Y ... .., 
means 
... 'If:'* ... 
that L has the pattern 
91 92 92 92 
92 91 92 92 
92 92 91 92 
92 92 92 91 
- -- - -
93 93 9 . . . 9 3 3 
I 93 I 
I 93 
I 93 I 
I . 
I . 
I 93 
1 -I 94 I 
CJ 2 • 
e 
(2.1) 
Conditional on R, 
the variances of the n interim signals Yi have the common value a;. the 
covariance of each pair of these signals is pa 2 the variance of earnings y' 
is a 2 , and the covariance of each interim signal and earnings is wa a • 
e y e 
Other covariance structures could be assumed, e.g., the case where Lis a 
Toeplitz matrix whose (i,j)th element is pli-jla2. y The correlation 
between a pair of interim signals then depends on the number of signals 
occurring between them in the sequence, which may correspond to a separa-
tion time. Such covariance structures can in principle be analyzed by 
the techniques of Sections 3 to 5 below. 'If:'* The L of (2.1) will be used 
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here. It is a reasonable choice, generalizing previously studied covari-
ance structures while yielding tractable computations. 
Useful results involving conditional distributions can be derived by 
standard Bayesian calculations. Bayes estimators can then be found from 
the fact that a Bayes estimator minimizes the posterior conditional 
expected loss. Distributional results and Bayes estimators of R will be 
given in the next section. 
Define the scalar constants 
$ = 1 + (n - 1)p, 
Y1 = ($- p)[$(1 - p)a~]-1 
Yz = -p[$(1 - p)a~J- 1 
! is positive semidefinite if and only if (iff) + ~ 0, or equivalently 
-1/(n-1) $ p, and! is positive definite iff -1/(n-1) < p < 1. Simi-
* .... 
larly, ! is positive semidefinite iff $ - nw2 ~ 0, or equivalently 
* w2 S p + (1-p)/n, and! is positive definite iff w2 < p + (1-p)/n and 
p < 1. 
-1 Every diagonal element of ! is y 1 , every off-diagonal element y 2 , 
~*-1 -1 -1 -2 -1 i.e.,! • (1-p) a (I -p$ 11'). 
.... y .... nxn ........ 
Similarly, L has pattern (2.1) 
A s ,-1a-2 [w2/($- nro2) + ($- p)/(1- p)] 1 y 
A s $-1a-2 [w2 /($- nro 2 )- p/(1- p)] 
2 y 
A3 a -ro/($ - nro2 )a a y e 
~*-1 * Define the vector ll(n+1 )x 1 s L 1 • [~ 1 .···.~1 • ~2 ]', where 
"" 
~ 1 e Al + (n - l)A2 + A3 
~2 s: nA3 + A4 
and the scalars 
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'to .. 1/a~ , 
't1 • nH1a 2 , 
n y 
y • I yi/n ' 
i•1 
* a • 'tO + H'! n • 'to + n~l + ~2 ' 
-...... 
6 *'~*-1 * • y ~ y • 
- ... 
These will appear throughout the remaining sections. 
The expectation operator will be denoted by &, and the variance of Y 
conditional on R by at. y Note for later use that a~ • +a 2 /n • 1/'t y y 1 
and that the covariance of Y and E conditional on R is ~a a • y e 
3. POSTERIOR DISTRIBUTIONS AND BAYES ESTIMATORS 
Conditional and marginal distributions of interest are derived in 
Theorems 3.1 to 3.4. 
Theorem 3.1. The post:er:ior dens:i t:y of R g:iven Y • y :is 
Proof: Observe that fR(r) « exp[-t't0(r- y0 ) 2 ] and 
-1 -1 -1 fYIR(yfr) « exp[-t(Y'I y- 2rl'I y + r 21'! !)]. 
N N ~ ~ N ~ ~ 
Using the relations 1'!-11 • 't1 and 1'!-1y • 't1y, the joint density of Y 
- ... -
and R is 
where terms not involving rare omitted. Since fy(y), which is obtained by 
...... 
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integrating rout of (3.1), is a constant relative tor, it follows that 
fRIY(rly) is proportional to the right side of (3.1). Inspection or com-
- -
pleting the square finishes the proof. Q.E.D. 
Given Y = y, the posterior mean of R is a weighted average of y0 
and y. The weights are proportional to ~ 0 • the reciprocal of the 
variance o~ of the prior density of R, and ~ 1 • the reciprocal of the 
variance of Y given the value of R. Thus, a more diffuse prior density 
for R results in lower weight on y0 in the posterior mean of R. Converse-
ly, greater variability in the density of Y given R, which could be 
caused by a higher correlation p, results in lower weight on yin the 
posterior mean of R. 
* * Theorem 3.2. Ihe posrer~or dens~~Y ofR g~ven Y = y ~s N[P/a, 1/a]. 
Proof: Substituting terms defined in Section 2 into fR and f!*IR yields 
* fY*,R(y ,r) « exp[-f{ar2 - 2Pr + 6 + ~0y0 }) 
- -
(3.2) 
* The terms a2 /a, 6, and ~0y0 involve y but not r, so 
-
fRIY*(rly*) « exp[-fa(r- a/a)2] . 
- -
Q.E.D. 
* * Given Y • y , the posterior mean B/a of R is a weighted average of y0 , 
y, and e with weights proportional to ~0 = 1/o0, n~ 1 • and ~2 . When wsO, 
n~ 1 = ~ 1 and ~2 • 1/o! are the reciprocals of the variances of Y and E, re-
spectively, given the value of R. In general, n~ 1 and ~ 2 are sums of ele-
~*-1. ments of ~ 
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Under a squared-error loss function, the posterior conditional 
expected loss is minimized by the posterior mean. Therefore, with squared-
error loss, the Bayes estimator of R given Y • y is 
* * <~ 0y0 + ~ 1 y)/(~ 0 + ~ 1 ), and the Bayes estimator of R given y z y is 
a/a, which equals 
Under any symmetric loss function, the Bayes estimators of R given Y • y 
* * and R given Y = y are identical to the corresponding estimators under 
squared-error loss. 
Empirical and theoretical considerations suggest that an asymmetric 
loss function may be more appropriate than a symmetric one (see Hosomatsu, 
1980). The loss that results from overestimating R may be greater than the 
loss that results from underestimating R by the same amount. Under the 
asymmetric loss function 
if a ~ r 
(3.3) 
if a > r 
where constants c 1 and c 2 are positive, the Bayes estimator of R is the 
pth quantile of the posterior distribution of R, where p • c 1 /(c1 +c2 ) = 
-1 (1+c 2 /c 1 ) (see Box and Tiao, 1973, p. 309). A ratio of penalty factors 
c 2 /c1 exceeding 1 produces a quantile lying below the median of the 
posterior distribution given by Theorem 3.1 or Theorem 3.2. With this loss 
* * -1 function, the Bayes estimator of R given Y = y is B/a + ~ (p)/Ja, which 
equals 
(3.4) 
Another quantity whose distribution is of interest is E- E[RIY], 
which measures the extent of surprise in announced earnings. This distri-
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bution can be obtained from the marginal distribution of * y , which is 
given in Theorem 3.3. The proof of this theorem is sketched in the 
Appendix. 
* Theorem 3.3. The distribution of Y is 
* * * *' MVN[yo1 •L + ao1 1 ] 
.. --
Theorem 3.4. The distribution of E - 8[RIY] is normal N[O,v] where 
Proof: Define a = ~ 1 /n(~ 0 + ~ 1 ) and the column vector ~(n+ 1 )x 1 = 
[-al',1]'. Then 
is a linear combination of normals plus a constant, so it is normally 
distributed. Its expectation and variance, using Theorem 3.3 and the 
definitions of +• ~0 • and ~ 1 • are 
* a'(yo: ) - ~Oy0/(~0 + ~1) • O ; 
* * *' a'<I + a02 1 1 )a. a 2 {na2+n<n-1)pa2}-2anroa a +a2+a2(-na+1)2 
.. .. .. y y y e e 0 
= v Q.E.D. 
4. RELATIVE PRECISION OF EARNINGS 
Under certain conditions involving the model parameters, the earnings 
E are preempted by information observed prior to E. More precisely, the 
coefficient of E in the Bayes estimator obtained from the posterior 
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distribution of Theorem 3.2 is small. The magnitude of this coefficient 
indicates the importance of earnings as an information source conditional 
on the other information available concerning R. The coefficient of E in 
the Bayes estimator (3.4) of R is the relative precision of earnings. 
Define w0 • ~ 0 /a, w1 = n~ 1 /a, and w2 = ~2 /a. These are the coeffi-
cients of y0 , y, and e in a/a, so w2 is the relative precision of 
earnings, and the Bayes estimator (3.4) is 
where 
z !! 
-1 t ~ (p)/a 
( 4.1) 
Theorem 4.1. The coefficient w1 is positive, zero, or negative according 
to whether a2 is greater than, equal to, or less than roO' a • The 
e y e 
coefficient w2 is positive, zero, or negative according to whether ~0'~/n 
is greater than, equal to, or less than ooa a • y e 
~*. Proof. By the positive definiteness of k a and ~ - noo2 must be positive. 
Then 
= -~n=--.,...,- {: - roO' } 
a ( ~-noo2 ) u y y e 
(4.2) 
so n~ 1 > (•,<) 0 iff 
Similarly, 
> (=,<) (1)0' (1 • y e establishing the first result. 
~ - nA + A = --~~1--.,...,- {- nO'ro + ~} 2- 3 4 a (~-nro 2 ) u 
e y e 
( 4. 3) 
so ~ 2 > (=,<) 0 iff $a; > (=,<) nroO'yO'e' establishing the second result. 
Q.E.D. 
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Corollary 4.1. When n•1, w1 is positive, zero, or negative according to 
whether a 2 is greater than, equal to, or less than ~a a ; and w2 is e y e 
positive, zero, or negative according to whether a 2 is greater than, y 
equal to, or less than ~a a • y e 
This theorem provides a generalization of the sufficiency and redun-
dancy cases of Holthausen and Verrecchia (1981). Define the sufficiency 
case to occur when w1=0; in this case, the distribution of R given 
* * Y • y is identical to the distribution of R given E=e alone. This condi-
tiona! distribution of R is normal 
The earnings report contains all of the information present in the vector 
of interim signals, and.possibly more, pertaining to the final liquidating 
dividend R. In other words, E is sufficient for determining the behavior 
of R. The redundancy case occurs when w2•0; here, the distribution of R 
* * given Y • y is identical to the distribution of R given Y • y (or merely 
i = y) alone. This conditional distribution of R is normal 
The vector of interim signals, or simply the mean of these signals, 
contains all of the information present in the final earnings report, and 
possibly more, pertaining to the final liquidating dividend. In other 
words, E is redundant for determining the behavior of R. 
When n•l, these situations reduce to the sufficiency case and the 
redundancy case described by Holthausen and Verrecchia. An inspection of 
Corollary 4.1 indicates that sufficiency and redundancy occur when 
az=~a a and a 2 ·~a a , respectively. 
e y e y y e 
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Another interesting feature of these situations (for n~l) is that 
either y or e can have negative weight in the estimate of R. Only one of 
these weights can be negative, since 
*' 't'*-1 * n~ 1 + ~2 • 1 L 1 > 0 
The expressions for n~ 1 and ~2 in the proof of Theorem 4.1 can be used to 
calculate conditions on the model parameters under which the relative 
precision of earnings, w2 , is small. The next theorem shows several of 
these conditions. 
Theorem 4.2. In the model of Section 2, fix all parameters except n, a2 y' 
or (J 2 • Let 
e 
( i) n ~ oo, (ii) 1/az ~ oo, y or (iii) l/a 2 ~0· e ' then w1 ~ 1 
and wo· w2' z ~0 in the Bayes estimator B of (4.1). 
-1 Proof: (i) The definitions of >.. 1 to 1 4 yield A- 1=0(1), 1 2=0(n ), 
-1 A. 3=0(n ), and A- 4=0(1) when p 1 0, w + 0. Then ~ 1 =0(1), ~2=0(1), and a 
-1 -1 -1 -t 
• O(n). Consequently, ~0 /a•O(n ), ~2 /a=O(n ), and~ (p)/Ja=O(n ), and 
as n ~ oo 
The calculation differ slightly when p = 0, w = 0, or both, but the results 
are the same. Parts (ii) and (iii) are proved similarly. Q.E.D. 
As the number of interim information signals increases without bound, 
the coefficient of their mean y in the Bayes estimator of R approaches 1 
and the relative precision of earnings approaches 0. The same results 
occur as the common variance of the interim information signals decreases 
to 0 or as the variance of the annual accounting random variable increases 
without bound. This generalizes the results of Holthausen and Verrecchia 
(1981) for the case of n•l. 
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The effects of the correlations p and oo on the components of B will 
now be examined. The analysis concerning p is of special interest, since 
it is not possible to analyze the importance of this parameter in deter-
mining information content when n•l. Moreover, the analysis involving oo 
extends results of Holthausen and Verrecchia, who considered only two 
limiting cases for oo, the cases of sufficiency and redundancy. 
Theorem 4.3. In the model of Section 2, fix all parameters except p and 
consider the Bayes estimator B. Asp increases: w0 increases; 1w 1 1 
decreases; w2 increases when w1 > 0 and ro > -1/T.Ooyae, and decreases when 
w1 < 0 or oo < -1/T.Oayae; and z increases when p 4 .5. There is one 
exception to these results: w0 , w1 , w2 , and z are independent of p when 
the sufficiency case occurs. 
Proof. Defining 
De (~ - nro 2 )(1 + T. o 2 )o 2 + n(a -roo ) 2 0 e y e y 
observe that~ increases with p and that, from (4.2) and (4.3), 
w1 • no (a - ooo )/D e e y 
= (~o 2 - nooa o )/D y y e 
Clearly w0 increases with p unless oe • ooay' in which case w0 • T. 0a~/(1 + 
T. 0 a~) is constant. The numerator of w1 is constant with respect to p 
whileD is a positive, increasing function of p. Thus lw1 1 is a decreasing 
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function of p unless ae = way' in which case w1 • 0 for any p. Next, for 
aw2 /a~ = na 2a (oo~0a a + l)(a - wa )/D2 y e y e e y 
Note that w1 > 0 iff ae - way > 0, so w2 is an increasing function of p 
then w2 decreases as p increases; and w1 < 0 implies oo > 0 {since a! -
wayae < 0), which again makes w2 a decreasing function of p. When w1 = 0, 
w2 = 1/(1 + ~oa!) for any value of p. aw2/a~ • 0, so 
Finally, -1 t because z = ~ (p){w0 /~0 } , z is a monotonically increasing 
function of w0 whenever p ~ .5. (When p = .5, z = 0 for any p.) Thus z 
is an increasing function of p except when w1 • 0, in which case z is 
constant. Q.E.D. 
The n correlated interim information signals can be interpreted as 
being equivalent to n' independent interim signals; as p increases, n' 
decreases. The magnitude of w1 decreases, so less weight is given to y, 
while w0 , which is always positive, increases. The behavior of w1 reflects 
the fact that a~ increases with p. The behavior of w2 , the relative 
precision of earnings, is more complex. When w2 > 0, it decreases as p 
increases if either w1 is negative or w < -1/~0ayae. When w2 < 0, it 
increases with p if w > -1/~0ayae. In both of these cases, w2 is decreas-
ing in magnitude. Similarly, when w2 > 0, it increases with p if w1 is 
positive and w > -1/~0ayae; when w2 < 0, it decreases as p increases if 
w < -11~ 0a a . y e In these cases, w2 is increasing in magnitude. 
example, as p approaches 1 with w • 0, 
where 
a = ~O + 1/a2 + 1/a2 Y e 
-1 -t 
z t ~ (p)/a , 
For 
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In the sufficiency case, though, none of these consequences follows 
from a change in p; since y has weight w1 • 0 in B here, it makes sense 
that p should not affect w0 , w1• w2, and z, as Theorem 4.3 shows to be the 
situation. 
Theorem 4.4. In the model of Section 2, fix all parameters except ~ and 
consider the Bayes estimator B. 
0'~ y < As increases, 
Take p .. • 5. ( i) Assume that 
and z increase (decrease) iff 
~ < (>) +a Ina , or equivalently ~0' a < (>) O'~Y or w2 > ( <) 0; w1 y e y e 
* * increases (decreases) iff~ > ~ (~ < ~ ), where 
and w2 is a decreasing function of ~. (ii) Assume that 0'~ • a2 • Then y e 
w0 and z are increasing functions of ~. while w1 and w2 are decreasing 
function of ~. (iii) Assume that a~ > a 2 • As ~ increases, w0 and z y e 
increase (decrease) iff ~ < (>) ae/ay, or equivalently w1 > (<) 0; w1 is a 
** decreasing function of ~; and w2 increases (decreases) iff ~ > ~ 
** (~ < Ill ), where 
~**a [a~- {(a~+ ao2)(a~- a2)}t]/a a y y y e y e 
If p • .5, then z is zero for any Ill. 
Proof. Taking derivatives, 
aw1 talll • n2 ~ a a [(a2 + a2)(a2 - a~)- (a2 -lila a )2]fD2 0 y e e 0 e y e y e 
aw2/alll • n2 ~ a a [(a~+ a02 )(ay~- a2) - (aL -·lila a )2}fD2 0 y e y e y y e 
-19-
Because z is a monotonically increasing function of w0 for p + .5, it 
behaves exactly as w0 does. 
From (4.2) and (4.3), aw0 ta~ has the same sign as w1w2 and w1w2 • In 
case (i), cov(Y,E) • ~a a < a2 , so by Theorem 4.1, w1 is positive, and y e e 
w1w2 > 0 iff w2 > 0 iff •a;/n • a¥ > ~ayae. Thus aw0/a~ is positive 
iff ~ < .a Ina . Reversing inequalities shows that aw0 taw is negative iff y e 
~ > •a Ina . y e In case (iii), ~a a < a!.., y e Y so by Theorem 4.1 w2 is 
positive, and w1w2 > 0 iff w1 > 0 iff > ~(J (J • y e 
positive (negative) iff ~ < (>) a /a • In case (ii), ~a a is less than 
e y y e 
both a! and (Jy• so both wl and w2 are positive, as is awo/a~. 
Now consider aw 1 /a~. It must be negative in cases (ii) and (iii). (It 
cannot be zero even in (ii), since if a • wa holds, then a 2 < a~ 
e y e y 
follows from ~2 < ./n.) In case (i), aw1 ta~ is positive (negative) iff w > 
* * ~ (~ < ~ ). The same approach suffices for w2 by symmetry. Q.E.D. 
As ~ increases with all other parameters fixed and case ( i), 
aV < a~, w0 increases until ~ • •ay/nae' then decreases; w1 increases 
* until ~ • ~ , then decreases; and w2 is monotonically decreasing. The 
relative positions of •a Ina y e * and ~ depend on the parameter values. On 
the other hand, as ~ increases in case (iii), a~ > a2, w0 increases Y e 
until ro • ae/ay' then decreases; w1 decreases monotonically; and w2 
** increases until ~ • ro , then decreases. Again the relative positions of 
** the critical points, a /a and ~ , depend on the parameter values. 
e y 
The behavior of the relative precision of earnings w2 when the 
correlation~ changes is determined by the model's remaining parameter 
values. If o~ ~ a 2 y e • w2 decreases as ro increases; increasing the 
covariance between E and the less variable quantity Y reduces the weight 
attached to E in forming the Bayes estimator B. If a~ > a 2 so E has y e' 
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** greater precision than Y, w2 again decreases as w increases tow • w 
however, w2 then changes direction and increases as w continues to rise. So 
for a large value of w, a larger weight is attached to E, the relatively 
more precise source of information. 
5. MAGNITUDE OF BELIEF REVISION 
When the earnings release E becomes known, the analysts revise their 
* * estimates of R by using the posterior density of R given Y •y rather than 
the posterior density of R given Y=y . The extent of change in the ana-
lyst forecast will be treated in this section. For convenience, assume 
that a squared-error or other symmetric loss function is used, making the 
posterior mean of R the estimator of choice. 
The magnitude of belief revision is 
* the difference between the posterior mean of R given Y and the posterior 
mean of R given Y. It is the amount by which the analyst forecast will 
be changed when E is revealed. It can be expressed as 
(5.1) 
where w s ~0 (n~1 -~ 1 )/~2 can be thought of as a covariance adjustment term. 
Its value depends on p and w; w = 0 when w = 0. The methods used to prove 
Theorem 3.4 show that 6[~]=0 and 
(5.2) 
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The distribution of ~ is normal, for ~ is a linear combination of compon-
* ents of the multivariate normal vector Y plus a constant. This estab-
lishes the following theorem. 
Theorem 5.1. The magnitude of belief revision~ is normally distributed 
with mean zero and variance given by equation (5.2). 
Special cases of particular value are examined in the next two 
theorems. 
Theorem 5.2. When w•O, equation (5.2) reduces to 
where 
't • l/a 2 
e e 
Proof: By substitution of w=O into formulas of Section 2 and of these into 
(5.2). Q.E.D. 
Theorem 5.3. Fix all parameters except n, a2 , or a 2 • y e As (i) n-+ oo, 
(ii) 1/a2 -+ oo, or (iii) 1/a2 -+ 0, y e 
var[d -+ 0 
Proof: This is an immediate consequence of Theorem 4.2 and an analogous 
Q.E.D. 
Other cases of interest have yielded expressions that do not simplify 
(5.2) appreciably. These will not be reproduced here. 
The magnitude of belief revision is zero if E•e results in the 
equality 
B 'toYo+n~lY+w2E 'toYo+'t1Y 
- a = 
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Somewhat surprisingly, the value of E that produces k'"•O is not 
( 5. 3) 
The further E is from the expression in (5.3), the greater lk'"l will be. 
The magnitude of belief revision is closely related to the extent of 
surprise in earnings, E- 6[RIY], defined in Section 3. It follows 
from Theorem 3.1 and (5.1) that 
I( = (~2 /a){E - 8[RIY] + ~(Y - y0)/(~0 + ~ 1 )} 
"" 
Thus when n 2 is positive (negative), k'" is an increasing (decreasing) 
function of the extent of surprise in earnings. 
6. INTERPRETATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The above analysis demonstrates that the relative importance of 
earnings depends upon the information covariance structure. The increased 
dimensionality of the covariance structure in this paper, relative to that 
of Holthausen and Verrecchia (1981), provides new insights regarding 
theoretical determinants of the importance of earnings. The correlation 
of interim nonaccounting signals is an important determinant of the 
importance of earnings. As this correlation increases, the relative 
importance of earnings increases. In effect, there is less prior informa-
tion available as the correlation increases. The importance of correlation 
in determining earnings information content has been overlooked in the 
accounting literature, where extent of prior information availability has 
been interpreted to be synonymous with the frequency of prior information 
arrival. Grant (1980), for example, used the number of WaJJ Screet 
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Journal articles as a surrogate for extent of prior information availabil-
ity, and showed that the number of news articles is systematically greater 
for listed firms than for nonlisted ones. Depending on the extent of 
correlation among various news articles pertaining to a firm, extent of 
press coverage may be a weak surrogate for extent of prior information 
availability. 
We also generalize the analysis of Holthausen and Verrecchia (1981) 
concerning the correlation between interim nonaccounting signals and 
earnings. They considered the limiting cases of sufficiency and redun-
dancy, which we also consider. Sufficiency occurs when the weight attached 
to interim information in posterior beliefs is zero. Earnings contain all 
of the information in interim signals and perhaps more. Redundancy occurs 
when the weight attached to earnings in posterior beliefs is zero. Interim 
signals contain all of the information in earnings and perhaps more. We 
consider sufficiency to be an unlikely possibility, particularly when the 
analysis treats all interim information rather than just one interim 
report. Redundancy means, in effect, that earnings are entirely preempted 
by interim information, a possibility we consider to be more likely, 
particularly when the analysis is extended to all interim information 
rather than just one interim report. In addition to the two limiting cases, 
we analyze a range of cases involving the correlation between interim 
signals and earnings. Earnings can actually increase in importance as the 
correlation between interim signals and earnings increases. This occurs 
when the variance a~ of the sample mean is greater than the variance a2 y e 
of earnings, making earnings the more precise source of information. As the 
correlation between accounting and nonaccounting sources of information 
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increases, more of the weight in posterior belief formation will be placed 
on the relatively more precise source of information. 
Another interesting theoretical possibility is that earnings could 
receive a negative weight in the posterior estimate of the liquidating 
dividend, depending in part on the extent of correlation between the 
interim signals and earnings. The posterior estimate of the liquidating 
dividend could conceivably move in the opposite direction from that implied 
by the earnings release. 
Our results concerning the number of prior available signals are 
consistent with the intuition provided by the models of Ohlson (1979) and 
Holthausen and Verrecchia (1981). The importance of earnings increases as 
the cumulative precision of prior information availability decreases. 
Our results involving the precision of earnings are consistent with 
Holthausen and Verrecchia (1981). The importance of earnings decreases as 
the precision of earnings decreases. In both our model and theirs, 
precision is the inverse of the variance with which earnings are distrib-
uted around the liquidating dividend of the firm. In other words, preci-
sion refers to the extent to which earnings are informative regarding 
future dividends of the firm. The greater the variance, the greater the 
"noise" in earnings. This interpretation highlights the connection between 
the model and the empirical domain. In a multiperiod world, the parameter 
of interest to investors is the vector of uncertain future dividends. The 
extent to which earnings are informative concerning this vector is a major 
determinant of the importance of earnings. This view suggests that one 
possible role for regulatory bodies that set accounting standards is to 
minimize, wherever possible, the "noise" in earnings as an information 
source for predicting future cash flows and dividends. For example, 
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transitory components in earnings, such as large write-offs of bad debts or 
obsolete inventory, should be disclosed separately in the income statement 
so that implications for future cash flow and dividend streams can be 
sorted out by investors. Any disclosure requirement that increases the 
precision of earnings as an information source for prediction potentially 
increases the social usefulness of earnings reports. 
Finally, our results involving the precision of individual prior 
information signals are also consistent with Holthausen and Verrecchia 
(1981). The extent to which individual prior signals from nonaccounting 
sources are informative regarding future firm dividends is also an impor-
tant determinant of the importance of earnings. The greater the "noise" 
in individual prior signals, the greater the potential importance of 
earnings. In our model, precision is additive and will therefore also 
depend on the number of prior information signals. 
Will the (cumulative) precision of prior information or the precision 
of earnings differ systematically across different types of firms? This is 
a difficult question, empirically, since precision of information cannot be 
observed directly, necessitating surrogate selection. Nevertheless, the 
answer to the question is important in understanding current empirical 
results such as those reported by Grant (1980) and Atiase (1980), who 
showed that the price reaction to earnings reports is systematically 
greater for smaller firms. A common interpretation of their results in the 
empirical literature is that the (cumulative) precision of prior informa-
tion differs systematically between smaller and larger firms. In other 
words, the extent of availability of nonaccounting information declines 
with firm size. 
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We offer an alternative interpretation of the apparent firm-size 
effect, namely, that the precision of accounting information differs 
systematically between smaller and larger firms. Feltham (1983) analyzes 
the importance of firm-specific information, relative to information about 
economy-wide state variables, in updating beliefs about future firm 
dividends. It is possible that firm-specific "shocks" or events, rather 
than economy-wide events, assume systematically greater importance for the 
valuation of smaller firms, reflecting the tendency for smaller firms to 
have less diversified asset portfolios. Since accounting information is a 
major source of information about firm-specific events, it is possible that 
the precision of accounting information is systematically greater for small 
firms relative to large firms. 
We also demonstrate that the information content of earnings increases 
as the extent of surprise in earnings increases. By extent of surprise, we 
mean the extent to which earnings fail to confirm (cumulative) prior 
information from nonaccounting sources. For example, suppose that economy-
wide information tells investors that the overall state of the economy, 
assumed to be a critical state variable affecting firm cash flows, is 
improving over the previous year. Consequently, investors will revise 
their beliefs about dividends (hence, firm value) in a favorable direction. 
If firm earnings for the year are announced to be unfavorable, we say that 
the earnings fail to confirm prior information from nonaccounting sources. 
Depending on the precision of earnings as a source of information, informa-
tion content and, consequently, price reaction could be dramatic. If the 
unfavorable earnings are due to some source of "noise" such as a change in 
accounting policies that has no implications for firm cash flows, posterior 
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beliefs about future cash flows and dividends will not change significantly 
and there will be little price reaction. 
Empirical researchers in accounting have tended to select surrogates 
for expected firm earnings using earnings time series models or perhaps the 
contemporaneous earnings announcements of other firms in the same industry. 
Our analysis suggests that researchers should measure unexpected earnings 
using prior information from nonaccounting sources, in order to determine 
the extent to which earnings fail to confirm (cumulative) prior informa-
tion. Alternatively, researchers might observe directly the earnings 
forecasts of professional analysts, which presumably incorporate informa-
tion from nonaccounting sources. 
In conclusion, it has been well established by empirical researchers 
that earnings possess information content for investors. This paper 
provides a theoretical framework for analyzing the information content of 
earnings. 
APPENDIX. PROOF OF THEOREM 3.3 
Integrating r out of (3.2) gives 
r*-1 where N = - (1/a)llll'. 
~ NN 
* y 
... 
Therefore 
-1 ~*+ * *' -1 * the theorem follows by noting that ~ • ~ (1/~ 0)1 1 and ~ ! = (a/~ 0)1 . 
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